As a general matter, Illinois contract law holds that a contract entered into by a minor is voidable.  That is, while the contract is not automatically void, the minor may nevertheless undo the contract even after entering into it.  This can leave the other party in an uncertain, even potentially precarious, situation, not being able to know for years whether the contract will remain in place. This is especially relevant in the entertainment industry, when children and teenagers may play important roles in a particular venture.

To that end, the Artistic Contracts by Minors Act (820 ILCS 20) establishes a procedure to validate such contracts.  Introduced around 1990, the Act applies to contracts for “artistic or creative services,” including but not limited to “services as an actor, actress, dancer, musician, comedian, singer, or other performer or entertainer, or as a writer, director, producer, production executive, choreographer, composer, conductor, or designer.”  Either party to a contract may file a petition in state circuit court to seek the court’s approval.  If the court does approve, then the contract may not be disaffirmed on the grounds that a party was a minor when the agreement occurred.

Admittedly, this law is rather light on specific details, and relevant case law is difficult to find.  Many questions remain.  What is the standard that a court should use to approve a contract?  Merely that it “is otherwise valid,” or are there broader concerns of fairness?  What discretion do judges have, if any?  What is the full scope of “artistic or creative services”?  For example, would it cover a teenage programmer designing websites?  Or an agreement to license photograph taken by a minor?  Are modeling services covered?  And might the answer depend on what the other party plans to do with those services?  Would, say, developing a website for a car dealership be treated differently than a website for a theater or a band?

As we said earlier, there is little guidance for courts interpreting this law.  But for people hiring minors for work that is squarely within the scope of the Act, a proper petition can bring certainty and stability to creative endeavors.  On the other hand, minors who work in an artistic field (and the guardians and lawyers who look out for their interests) should take care not to be caught off guard by a petition for court approval, especially if those minors are counting on the possibility of voiding the contract in the future.

One of the recurring questions about Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) is how much time a would-be plaintiff gets to file a lawsuit.  One Illinois appellate court has finally taken steps towards settling this important issue.

In Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc. (2021 IL App (1st) 200563), the plaintiff alleged that his defendant-employer violated BIPA through the improper use of fingerprint scanning for employee timekeeping.  The principal plaintiff stopped working for the defendant in January 2018, and the lawsuit was not filed until March 2019.  The defendant moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds, and the trial court granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue.

BIPA itself has no limitations period, but other Illinois laws set various default periods. The issue is whether to apply the 1-year period for “for publication of matter violating the right of privacy” under 735 ILCS 5/13- 201 or the 5-year for “all civil actions not otherwise provided for” under 735 ILCS 5/13- 205.

The appellate court reasoned that although BIPA protects a right to privacy, but not all BIPA violations involve “publication of matter.”  For the court, this was the key.  BIPA itself specifies five different duties, at 740 ILCS 14/15.  To summarize:

   (a) Duty to establish a retention schedule and destruction guidelines.
   (b) Forbidding collection biometrics without written consent.
   (c) Forbidding the sale of biometrics.
   (d) Forbidding disclosure of biometrics without written consent.
   (e) Duty of care in storing biometrics.

The court ultimately determined that (a) making retention schedules, (b) collecting biometrics, and (e) storing biometrics do *not* involve “publication of matter,” and so, these causes of action have a 5-year limitations period.  On the other hand, (c) selling biometrics, and (d) disclosing biometrics *do* have an element of publication, and so these causes of action have just a 1-year limitations period. For now, the case has been remanded to the trial court, and it is unknown whether either party will appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.  However, at the moment, this decision will likely serve as an easy precedent for other courts to follow.  Any would-be defendants who were relying on a uniform 1-year limitations period should tread cautiously and be prepared.  Any would-be plaintiffs who were counting on a uniform 5-year limitations period should act quickly.  And anyone who plans collects biometric data in the future should take care to have a retention and disposal policy in place, as well as the appropriate notices and waivers, so as not to end up in court in the first place.